On August 21, a strict public morality law was issued in Afghanistan. The 114-page document outlining the legislation contains provisions that cover transportation, media, music, public spaces and personal conduct. Among its most restrictive provisions are a ban on music and on women singing or reading aloud in public.
The announcement of the law provoked widespread condemnation internationally and raised questions about the direction in which the Taliban government is taking Afghanistan given past promises to ease restrictions on women.
The law also caused a lot of unease in Afghanistan, even if opposition was not voiced publicly. This has prompted the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, to call for the group’s members to avoid division and embrace unity.
While the public morality legislation makes clear that the Taliban is pressing ahead with ultra-conservative policies in the face of international criticism, it also reflects growing tensions within its leadership.
Kandahar vs Kabul
In the lead-up to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 2021, some Taliban officials sought to persuade the international community that a Taliban 2.0 had emerged, which held more moderate views on governance compared with the old guard’s highly conservative and stringent approach.
This new guard spoke the language of international diplomacy and made clear its desire to scrap more conservative policies to attract international support and secure legitimacy for the new Taliban government.
The formation of the interim cabinet, however, showed the first signs that the old guard was not ceding power. Promises of an inclusive government were not fulfilled, and some members of the old guard were given key roles, including Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund, one of the Taliban’s founders who was appointed prime minister; Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was appointed as his deputy; and Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, the son of another Taliban founder, Mullah Omar, who was made defence minister.
As the interim government took on the uneasy task of steering the country away from collapse, Akhundzada established his residence in Kandahar as another seat of power, declaring himself in charge of political, military and religious affairs.
Over the past two years Akhundzada has made clear he does not intend to step back from his hardline positions. In March 2022, on his order, girls and women were banned from attending secondary school and university.
He has also sought to concentrate power in his own hands and further tighten the old guard’s grip on the government. He ordered a number of cabinet reshuffles in which his loyalists were appointed.
In September 2022, Education Minister Noorullah Munir was replaced by Maulvi Habibullah Agha, one of the figures closest to the supreme leader. In May this year, Health Minister Qalandar Ebad, a trained doctor and the only technocrat in the Taliban government, was replaced by Noor Jalal, a hardline cleric and former deputy interior minister.
While Akhundzada appears in control, signs of growing internal divisions have surfaced. In February 2023, Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani implicitly criticised him, saying, “Monopolising power and hurting the reputation of the entire system are not to our benefit. … The situation cannot be tolerated.”
In his Eid al-Fitr message this year, the interior minister again hinted at internal troubles. He called on the Taliban to avoid creating divisions with the Afghan people.
Akhundzada, for his part, urged Taliban officials during Eid to set aside their differences and serve the country properly. He has repeated this call for unity frequently, most recently during a rare trip to northern Afghanistan, in which he met with local leaders.
Dissent and silencing
The public morality law codifies rules that the Taliban promoted before but did not fully enforce. Now, the law empowers the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice to monitor, censure and punish any Afghan citizen found in violation of it.
The announcement of this legislation demonstrates that the old guard of the Taliban led by the supreme leader have an upper hand in directing policy. This is yet another sign that the Taliban 2.0 is not a more “moderate” version of the group that ruled in Afghanistan in the 1990s.
Previously, Taliban representatives who touted the Taliban 2.0 idea hinted behind closed doors at international forums that certain hardline officials could be replaced to appease the international community.
But developments over the past year, including the vice and virtue law, show that the old guard, who believe in the need for a rigid stance to maintain unity within the group, are suppressing the voices of the new guard, creating a culture of conformity through fear, replacement and sidelining.
In interviews I have conducted with current and former Taliban representatives who do not support some of the conservative policies of the Taliban government, some have shared that they have relocated their families to other countries. One of them said: “The family is more comfortable abroad and the children’s education can seamlessly continue.”
The lack of public response to the vice and virtue law may signal that disgruntled Taliban members who disapprove of it would not risk breaking the unity of the group over policy disagreements.
Silencing of dissent, however, does not help with the two major problems the Taliban is facing: growing dissatisfaction among the Afghan population and continuing international isolation.
The government in Kabul is feeling the pressure from the Afghan people, who are asking for services and jobs amid a collapsing economy and limited international assistance. That can be alleviated only by gaining international recognition of the Taliban government.
However, efforts of some Taliban members, including Haqqani, to reach out to the international community and seek engagement, more aid and investment are being undermined by Kandahar doubling down on policies like education bans for girls and women and the morality law.
In the end, Akhundzada’s strategy of consolidating power may have the opposite of the intended effect: It may sow more internal division that could lead to fragmentation or even rebellion.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
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